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ABSTRACT—Commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago 
could hamper police efforts to seize guns on the street. Many police officers 
have understood the Fourth Amendment to permit stopping and frisking 
anyone who appears to possess a handgun in public. But that understanding 
is rooted in laws that made handgun possession a crime, the kinds of laws 
struck down in Heller and McDonald. The doctrinal collision that this 
appears to set up between the Second and Fourth Amendments will likely be 
less meaningful on the streets—particularly in low-income, minority 
neighborhoods—than commentators suggest. This is because the Fourth 
Amendment affords police many opportunities to dodge the collision. The 
aggressive forms of policing associated with gun interdiction in minority 
neighborhoods will likely continue, but now with added constitutional 
gravity. If gun rights advocates care about the fair distribution of Second 
Amendment rights, they should worry about the formal and practical 
opportunities the Fourth Amendment creates for the aggressive policing 
associated with firearm interdiction in poor minority communities. These 
advocates should make police reform and racial justice a core part of their 
agenda, something they have not done to date. 
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Commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of Chicago2 could 
hamper police efforts to seize guns on the street.3 This would seem to be 
confirmed by a spate of recent federal court opinions suggesting that Second 
Amendment doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine are on a collision 
course.4 The Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion” that a crime 
has occurred (or is about to occur) to justify an investigative stop.5 Police 
officers in some American cities have understood the Fourth Amendment to 
permit stopping and frisking anyone who reasonably appears to possess a 
handgun in public.6 That understanding is rooted in laws like those in 
 
 1 554 U.S. 570 (2007). 
 2 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 3 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2015) (noting 
that “courts are scrutinizing gun regulations with renewed vigor”); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 
123 YALE L.J. 82, 105 (2013) (explaining that Heller and McDonald could result in a “nationalized 
approach” to gun regulations that could interfere with local rules); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect 
a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2008) (recognizing the 
difficulty New York City may have in maintaining its gun control laws post-Heller); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated 
Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that Heller may jeopardize police 
efforts to get guns off the streets). 
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that police discovery of 
a gun in a backpack did not justify a full search of the bag); Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 
785 F.3d 1128, 1131–32 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (finding that a legally armed individual is not 
“armed and dangerous” in the context of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 
540 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that exercising the right to possess a weapon cannot justify reasonable 
suspicion); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 215, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a report that 
the defendant was possessing a weapon did not alone justify reasonable suspicion); see also United States 
v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding 
that merely possessing a firearm does not justify a stop-and-frisk). 
 5  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 6 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry 
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 70 (2015) (noting that 8.9% of recorded stop and frisks 
in New York City between 2004 and 2012 were for a “suspicious bulge”—a visual cue of gun possession); 
see also Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008), 
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Washington D.C. and Illinois that made handgun possession a crime.7 In 
Heller and McDonald, however, the Court read the Second Amendment to 
forbid outright handgun bans.8 The doctrinal collision that this appears to set 
up will likely be less meaningful on the streets—particularly in low-income, 
minority neighborhoods—than commentators suggest. This is because the 
Fourth Amendment affords police many opportunities to dodge the collision. 
This potential for avoidance is deeply troublesome if the Second 
Amendment’s purpose is to enable citizens to resist unlawful private and 
public violence.9 Principled Second Amendment advocates should oppose 
gun interdiction and the aggressive forms of policing that go along with it. 
That in turn means taking police reform and racial justice far more seriously 
than they have to date.10 
The most aggressive forms of urban gun interdiction occur in so-called 
“high crime areas”11—usually poor minority neighborhoods that are 
epicenters of handgun violence.12 Before Heller and McDonald, cues of 
handgun possession like “furtive movement” and “waistband bulges” in a 
high-crime neighborhood would provide “reasonable suspicion.”13 In the 
wake of these two key cases, however, that may no longer be true. If 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html [https://perma.cc/7BNU-AFBV] (noting the 
routineness of questionable stops based on gun possession). 
 7 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742; Heller, 554 U.S. at 571. 
 8 The Court forbade such laws to the extent that they prohibited handgun possession in the home. See 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. The Court has not directly addressed the scope of the Second Amendment 
outside the home. Heller and McDonald, however, do strongly imply that the Second Amendment confers 
protection outside the home. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has decided that the [Second] [A]mendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as 
important outside the home as inside.” (citing Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012))). 
 9 The Supreme Court has suggested that this is in fact the point. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. The 
Court’s further suggestion that there may be a constitutional right to self-defense raises the provocative 
question of whether such a right extends to resisting unlawful seizures by the police. See Kindaka Sanders, 
A Reason to Resist: The Use of Deadly Force in Aiding Victims of Unlawful Police Aggression, 52 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 695, 716 (2015). 
 10 See Adam Winkler, The Right to Bear Arms Has Mostly Been for White People, WASH. POST (July 
15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/15/the-right-to-bear-arms-has-
mostly-been-reserved-for-whites/?utm_term=.734b238320b1 [https://perma.cc/L8C2-55RB]. Second 
Amendment activists’ lack of attention to race is ironic given its historic centrality in the debates about 
gun rights and restrictions. See Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[https://perma.cc/4SNV-ZUF9]. 
 11 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
 12 See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 335, 339–41 (2014). 
 13 See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1130 (6th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical 
Assessment of Police Shootings, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 189, 198 (2017). 
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handguns are presumptively legal,14 police officers might not even be able to 
stop individuals to check for a license.15 However, Second Amendment 
advocates should not be sanguine about the likelihood that the aggressive 
forms of policing associated with gun interdiction will end. 
The Fourth Amendment “reasonable suspicion” standard is more 
permissive of gun interdiction than it initially appears. In conjunction with 
state licensing rules, the Fourth Amendment will likely accommodate 
aggressive gun interdiction in many poor, minority neighborhoods. Failing 
that, “consent” is another Fourth Amendment doctrine that is unaffected by 
the Second Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits suspicionless 
searches if the subject consents.16 However, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted “consent” to require considerably less of police than the word’s 
ordinary meaning would suggest—the police may use coercive power to 
coax a “yes” from targets.17 
The formal latitude created by Fourth Amendment doctrine only begins 
to suggest the practical latitude police enjoy on the streets. We tend to 
conceptualize Fourth Amendment doctrine as prospectively regulating 
police authority. In practice, however, these doctrines are after-the-fact 
narrative resources that can be used as post hoc rationales for conduct that 
police think a court might view as unconstitutional. Because Fourth 
Amendment regulation of street policing depends heavily on such accounts 
of what did (and did not) transpire, police enjoy considerable opportunity for 
subterfuge. Heller and McDonald will do little to change this. If Second 
Amendment rights are to be fairly distributed, then gun rights advocates must 
address this reality and make police reform a core part of their agenda. 
This Essay identifies the formal and practical opportunities that the 
Fourth Amendment creates for police to evade the Second Amendment on 
the streets, particularly in low-income, minority communities. Parts I 
through III discuss how the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion 
 
 14 The Supreme Court has not yet expressly held that the Second Amendment makes this true in 
public, but many states have enacted permissive gun laws that do. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-73(b) 
(2013) (allowing licensed individuals to carry unloaded handguns in their vehicles); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13-3102(A)(2), 13-3111(A) (2014) (no permit required for open or concealed carry provided 
that certain age and other restrictions satisfied); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-126(g) (2016) (allowing various 
forms of firearms possession even without a carry license); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68(C)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2007) (defining possession of a firearm as including open concealed or concealed carry); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.15(b)(6) (West 2017) (defining carrying a gun as including open or 
concealed carry). 
 15 Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless stop 
of motorist for license check). 
 16 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002). 
 17 See Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in 
Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 114 (2011). 
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standard, Terry frisks,18 and the definition of consent permit such evasion. 
Part IV sums up how police can use these Fourth Amendment rationales as 
after-the-fact justifications for stops and searches that threaten Second 
Amendment rights. 
I. EXPERTISE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 
The Second Amendment tolerates some criminal regulation of gun 
possession.19 Even in states with permissive gun laws, there are usually some 
restrictions. For example, many states require a license and prescribe 
whether handguns may be concealed in public.20 Violating these rules may 
be a misdemeanor criminal offense or an infraction.21 For those with previous 
felony convictions, possessing a firearm is generally a felony.22 These rules 
may allow the police to circumvent Second Amendment protections, at least 
in so-called “high-crime” neighborhoods. 
Most gun fatalities are handgun induced,23 and are concentrated 
amongst poor people of color.24 From the little data available, illegal firearms 
likely play an outsized role in these fatalities.25 That may reflect higher rates 
of illegal firearm ownership in poor minority communities than in other 
communities, but it is difficult to be certain. For years, the National Rifle 
Association has successfully thwarted public health and other demographic 
research about guns and gun violence.26 The paucity of available research 
 
 18 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 19 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2007). 
 20 See Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 918–927 (2015) (summarizing different states’ approaches). 
 21 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-84(a) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(M) (2014); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-132(b) (2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 2017). 
 22 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-131 (2017). 
 23 MICHAEL PLANTY & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, FIREARM VIOLENCE, 1993–2011, 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA6Q-R4UF]. 
 24 See id. at 5. 
 25 Cf. Philip J. Cook et al., Sources of Guns to Dangerous People: What We Learn by Asking Them, 
79 PREVENTIVE MED. 28, 35 (2015) (survey of ninety-nine “criminally active gun-involved” men 
admitted to Cook County jail); Anthony Fabio et al., Gaps Continue in Firearm Surveillance: Evidence 
from a Large U.S. City Bureau of Police, 10 SOC. MED. 13, 20 (2016) (79% of criminal perpetrators in 
Pittsburgh “are connected to firearms for which they are not the legal owner[s]”); see also Peter Hermann 
et al., One Illegal Gun. 12 Weeks. A Dozen Criminal Acts. The Rapid Cycle of Gun Violence. WASH. POST 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/one-gun-the-rapid-cycle-of-gun-
violence/?utm_term=.ad8d08befef2 [https://perma.cc/F9E9-RM98] (noting that many high-crime areas 
are plagued with the sharing of illegal firearms within gangs). 
 26 See Todd C. Frankel, Why the CDC Still Isn’t Researching Gun Violence, Despite the Ban Being 
Lifted Two Years Ago, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/
wp/2015/01/14/why-the-cdc-still-isnt-researching-gun-violence-despite-the-ban-being-lifted-two-years-
ago/?utm_term=.72f2378a467c [https://perma.cc/AT5F-HTAW]; Sheila Kaplan, Congress Quashed 
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funding has caused many urgent (and obvious) questions regarding guns to 
remain unanswered. Courts are sometimes willing to rely on police expertise 
to fill this kind of data gap,27 but police sampling is problematic and will be 
skewed by the police’s frequent contact with lawbreakers. 
When run through the filter of police expertise, the geographic 
concentration of handgun fatalities may undo any presumption of lawfulness 
that the Second Amendment creates. This seems especially likely in poor 
minority neighborhoods. Courts tend to credit police expertise with regard 
to whether an area is “high-crime.”28 The claim of expertise is usually based 
on officer testimony regarding personal experience in a place or with 
particular categories of misconduct.29 For example, an officer with homicide 
experience might offer testimony that most of the handgun fatalities in a 
particular neighborhood involved unregistered firearms. An officer with gun 
interdiction experience might make even broader generalizations about guns 
in a particular neighborhood. In the absence of meaningful data about rates 
of licensed and unlicensed gun ownership in an area, it is difficult to 
challenge those kinds of claims. If courts in a particular jurisdiction are 
persuaded that unlicensed firearms are pervasive in a neighborhood, they are 
likely to credit police officers’ assumptions that any given handgun there is 
likely illegal. That would, in effect, permit police to continue acting on cues 
of handgun possession as if handguns were legislatively forbidden. 
There are also more individualized techniques for generating 
reasonable suspicion regarding illegal handgun possession. For example, an 
individual’s apparent youth or manner of carrying a handgun may do the 
trick. Because licenses are restricted to individuals over a certain age (often 
twenty-one),30 a reasonable suspicion narrative could be conjured for anyone 
who appears to be younger than that age. In addition, officers who regularly 
patrol a particular location may be familiar with individuals who have 
 
Research into Gun Violence. Since Then, 600,000 People Have Been Shot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/health/gun-violence-research-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/WMC5-
2X68]. 
 27 See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2016–
24 (2017) (tracing the rise of police officers as expert witnesses and identifying sources of their expertise). 
 28 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2008). 
 29 See id. at 1607–08. 
 30 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(b)(2) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D) (LexisNexis 
2018), TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172(a)(2) (West 2016); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3(a) (2016). But see 
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(b) (2015) (allowing gun licensing at 18 years old). 
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noteworthy criminal histories.31 Awareness that a specific individual is a 
felon coupled with indicia of gun possession would provide reasonable 
suspicion.32 
The most important point about reasonable suspicion may be that 
officers typically craft the narrative account documenting it after the incident 
is over. This creates wide latitude for subterfuge, a topic taken up in the final 
Part of this Essay. 
II. TERRY FRISKS 
So long as an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual has or 
will commit a crime, the officer can likely search that individual for a 
handgun.33 Terry v. Ohio held that officers may conduct a limited scope pat-
down for weapons if it is reasonable to think that the suspect is “armed and 
dangerous.”34 Courts have been permissive in allowing pat-downs whenever 
it is plausible to think a suspect is armed. For example, in Michigan v. Long,35 
the Court concluded that Terry permits officers to search a vehicle cabin for 
firearms following a traffic stop because of the possibility that an 
unrestrained suspect could readily retrieve and use a weapon against the 
officers.36 
In United States v. Robinson, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the 
“armed and dangerous” standard is satisfied if an officer reasonably believes 
a suspect had a gun.37 The court held that an officer need not have formed a 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and then, separately, a 
reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.38 This reversed a three-judge 
panel’s earlier decision finding that West Virginia’s permissive handgun law 
created a presumption that guns were not dangerous per se.39 
Robinson suggests that, so long as police are able to generate a 
reasonable suspicion narrative for a stop, they will likely have latitude to 
search the individual for a gun. With the proliferation of rules governing 
 
 31 See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that an officer recognized 
a felon); United States v. Collins, 650 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (S.D.W. Va. 2009), aff’d, 390 F. App’x 273 
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that an officer and a felon recognized each other). 
 32 See Leo, 792 F.3d at 744; Collins, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 534.  
 33 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). 
 34 Id. at 27. 
 35 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 36 Id. at 1051–52. 
 37 846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 38 Id. at 700. 
 39 United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694 
(4th Cir. 2017). 
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traffic, it is easy for police to rationalize stopping a vehicle.40 Even in the 
pedestrian context it is not so difficult considering that in “high crime areas,” 
running away from an officer,41 averting one’s gaze from an officer, or 
staring too long at an officer, all might constitute “reasonable suspicion.”42 
III. CONSENT 
Police need not wait until they have reasonable suspicion that someone 
has an illegal handgun before approaching and searching him. In theory, if 
an individual refuses to consent, officers must discontinue the interaction and 
be on their way.43 The Fourth Amendment permits “consensual 
encounters”—the police may approach civilians and simply ask for 
permission to search them. The Supreme Court has noted with approval that 
obtaining “consent” is a common and effective investigation tactic in street 
and traffic policing.44 An encounter is “consensual” if a “reasonable 
[innocent] person” in the civilian’s position would have felt free to decline 
the police request.45 The Court has understood this standard to permit fairly 
high levels of police coercion. For example, the intimidation engendered by 
an officer’s uniform and weapon does not vitiate consent,46 nor does an 
individual’s ignorance as to her right to refuse the officer’s request.47 The 
Court has found a search consensual when multiple officers boarded a bus 
and asked to search while mere inches away from the suspect’s face.48 Many 
people would likely feel intimidated by such police conduct and submit to 
it.49 This is even truer for poor people of color. The standard for consent does 
not require courts to consider the unique sociological circumstances that 
make members of some communities more vulnerable to the police’s 
persuasive power than others. This ensures that what the Fourth Amendment 
considers “consent” is at distant remove from what most ordinary people 
consider “consent.” 
Consent doctrine also creates the opportunity for police to cast 
encounters that no one understood as voluntary when they occurred as if they 
 
 40 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1035–36 (noting that officers investigated car that was “traveling erratically 
and at excessive speed.”). 
 41 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
 42 See Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2008–2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 
176. 
 43 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983). 
 44 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973). 
 45 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002). 
 46 See id. at 204–05. 
 47 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). 
 48 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–200. 
 49 See id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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were. Including a few words in a police report to the effect that the officers 
asked for permission to conduct a search can make a mandatory request 
appear consensual. “Consent,” much like “reasonable suspicion,” is a post 
hoc narrative resource rather than an a priori restraint. It’s all in the telling. 
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT AS NARRATIVE RESOURCE 
Each of the Fourth Amendment justifications discussed above is 
ultimately a narrative resource available to officers following an arrest. This 
is typically when an officer puts pen to paper and creates a formal account 
of an encounter, identifying the specific rationales for the stop and search.50 
For the myriad encounters in which there is no arrest, citizens will have little 
incentive to litigate any perceived constitutional violations, and this is even 
more true for those who live in neighborhoods where gun interdiction efforts 
are most vigorous.51 Even though officers are obliged to uphold the 
Constitution whenever they search or seize, it will be the rare case in which 
they have to provide a formal account of the constitutional rationales for their 
choices. 
Whether an investigative stop was supported by consent or reasonable 
suspicion are factual questions for a judge. Both explicitly call for an analysis 
of the facts from the police officer’s perspective—would a reasonable officer 
have believed there was consent or evidence of criminal wrongdoing?52 This 
leaves police officers with considerable latitude to embellish or even 
manufacture facts. Doing so will not seem terribly ignoble when contraband 
was actually found, inevitably true where suppression is sought. Officers will 
typically have the narrative advantage over defendants. Not only are the 
former more seasoned witnesses than the latter, but they also have the 
credibility of their office. 
CONCLUSION 
Second Amendment advocates’ victories in the Supreme Court may not 
amount to much on the street. McDonald and Heller have changed the 
constitutional landscape in principle and have also set up an apparent 
doctrinal collision with the Fourth Amendment. Police will no longer be able 
to stop suspects based on cues of handgun possession. That collision, 
however, even if resolved in favor of Second Amendment rights, will likely 
fail to sufficiently protect gun owners in poor, minority neighborhoods. If 
 
 50 See Nirej Sekhon, Mass Suppression: Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51 GA. L. REV. 
429, 432 (2017). 
 51 See id. at 431–32. 
 52 Id. at 450, 452–53. 
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gun rights advocates care about the fair distribution of Second Amendment 
rights, they should be concerned about the formal and practical opportunities 
the Fourth Amendment creates for aggressive firearm policing. The Fourth 
Amendment is sieve-like when it comes to police regulation; most 
misconduct passes through without any judicial involvement or recognition. 
That reality, due to the intersection of the Second and Fourth Amendments, 
now has added constitutional gravity. 
Aggressive policing in high-crime neighborhoods burdens innocent 
residents of those neighborhoods, who are more likely to be hassled by police 
than similarly situated residents of other neighborhoods.53 This is ironic 
because residents of high-crime neighborhoods likely have more reason to 
avail themselves of the Second Amendment right to bear arms than those 
who live in safer neighborhoods. Second Amendment advocates should take 
note of this and include police reform and racial justice in their core agenda. 
 
 
 53 The Court has recognized as much. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2000) (finding 
that while individuals in high-crime areas may have innocent reasons for fleeing police, such as fear of 
law enforcement, officers and courts may still take into account such conduct when determining 
reasonable suspicion). 
